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Ibn Taymiyya’s Theological Ethics. By Sophia Vasalou Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. 
Hardback. ix, 342 pages. ISBN 978-0-19-939783-9. 
 
Abdul Rahman Mustafa 
 
This book is a long overdue and formidable study of the ethical thought of Ibn Taymiyya. It is 
the modern appropriation of a set of ideas commonly associated with Ibn Taymiyya – namely 
that Islam is a religion that is entirely compatible with nature and reason (fitra) – that prefaces 
Vasalou’s deeper study of Ibn Taymiyya’s views on the role of reason and revelation as sources 
of ethical knowledge. Vasalou begins by pointing out that one of Ibn Taymiyya’s primary 
scholarly preoccupations was to chart a theological via media, one that traversed a middle path 
between rival theological sects such as the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, and in the process to 
champion the synthesis of revelation and reason. Now Ibn Taymiyya might often use the 
vocabulary of objective rationalism, Vasalou says, but it would be mistake to take this as an 
indication of his agreement with the Muʿtazilite position that the ethical value of acts is inherent 
to them and is capable of being perceived by objective reason. In fact, Vasalou states at the very 
outset that one of the main claims of her book is that: “…Ibn Taymiyya’s claim of moral reason, 
examined more closely, turns out to be a rather misleading one” (p.6).  
Chapters 1 to 5 of the book expand on this central claim in various ways. In Chapter 1 Vasalou 
shows that the Muʿtazilites account of ethics was strongly deontological, whereas Ibn 
Taymiyya’s ethical theory is largely consequentialist in nature. Chapter 2 investigates Ibn 
Taymiyya’s account of the relationship between reason (ʿaql) and nature (fiṭra), with Vasalou 
concluding once again that, while celebrating fiṭra as a source of moral knowledge, Ibn Taymiyya 
also emphasizes the limitations of reason in providing knowledge of the ethical value of acts. In 
Chapter 3 Vasalou suggests that, far from being close to the Muʿtazilite camp, Ibn Taymiyya’s 
views on the role of reason in determining right and wrong are resonant of Ashʿarī thinking on 
the subject. Chapter 4 surveys some of the theological differences between the theology of Ibn 
Taymiyya, in which the wisdom and love of God are central concepts, and Ashʿarite and 
Muʿtazilite kalām, in which the wisdom and love of God are formally denied. Chapters 4 and 5 
also explore the relationship between welfare (maṣlaḥa) as a theological and legal concept in the 
works of the Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites and Ibn Taymiyya. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a 
counterpoint to the classical discussions that form the substance of the book by briefly 
surveying the ways in which some modern Muslim figures have conceived of Islam as a religion 
of fiṭra.   
 
A real strength of Vasalou’s book is that it avoids superficial readings of the source material. 
Acknowledging that Ibn Taymiyya’s terminology often has a “mercurial character” (p. 98), that 
his views are located within a cacophony of quotations from the works of his interlocutors and 
that his ideas are scattered across a vast array of works of different genres, Vasalou bravely 
persists in her heroic attempt to read Ibn Taymiyya holistically. She attempts to harmonize her 
subject’s seemingly dissonant views to offer a fuller picture of his intellectual stance – and does 
so conscious of the fact that this means she is ultimately offering her readers a “construction” 
(p. 223) of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought – one possible way of reading him without foreclosing other 
interpretations or constructions. Vasalou favors this method over the method of accounting for 
conceptual dissonances by hypothesizing about “diverging textual chronologies” (p. 127). 
Similarly, when it comes to reconciling the apparent tension between the Ashʿarite insistence 
that ethical judgments are grounded in human convention and the Ashʿarite claim that ethical 
judgments are grounded in human nature, Vasalou offers a constructive reading that attempts 
to reconcile these antinomies (p. 125).  
 
The book identifies consequentialism as the central pillar of Ibn Taymiyya’s ethical theory. We 
are told that it is the notion of utility or welfare (maṣlaḥa) that carries moral ultimacy in Ibn 
Taymiyya’s scheme of ethics (pp. 29, 34). Good – understood as that which is “pleasurable, 
beneficial or agreeable” (p. 35) – is, we are told, determined for Ibn Taymiyya by looking at the 
consequences of acts. This is contrasted with the strongly deontological bent of Muʿtazilite 
theories of ethics which held that good and evil were qualities inherent within acts. But there 
are also suggestions in Vasalou’s own discussion that the distance between Ibn Taymiyya’s 
theory and that of the Muʿtazilites might not be so great after all. In Muʿtazilite ethical theory 
itself, we are told “… even the strongest deontological affirmations turn out to have roots that 
are watered by deeper consequentialist considerations.” (p. 32.) This qualification about the 
centrality of consequentialism in Muʿtazilite account of ethics rings like a refrain throughout 
the book (see pp. 33, 41, 52, 100, 134). Sometimes, Vasalou herself finds appears to find it difficult 
to fully reconcile the varying resonances in Ibn Taymiyya’s ethical theory, which frequently 
speaks of good and evil in purely or predominantly deontological terms. Vasalou’s statement 
that Ibn Taymiyya offers “an account of the value of actions that is articulated exclusively in 
consequentialist terms.” (p. 184, emphasis mine) certainly sits in some tension with her claim 
that the notion of inherent right and good that the Muʿtazilites had deployed widely in their 
ethical theory, is after all, “not entirely absent from Ibn Taymiyya’s writings” (p. 185).   
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s real disagreement with the Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites is, Vasalou argues, 
predominantly theological rather than purely epistemological. Unlike the Ashʿarites, Ibn 
Taymiyya insists that “if human beings can act for moral reasons, so, a fortiori, does God.” (p. 
38). What Ibn Taymiyya finds intolerable is the view associated with certain followers of Ibn 
ʿArabī (p. 86) and Ashʿarites such as al-Ghazālī, who insist that disbelief and faith “are all equal 
as far as God is concerned” (p. 141). God’s commands are not random, Ibn Taymiyya insists. 
Rather, they are “grounded in the real ethical qualities of acts” (p. 140). God’s commands and 
prohibitions follow the “intrinsic merit of things in themselves” (p. 168). However, unlike the 
Muʿtazilites, Ibn Taymiyya also wants to insist that God is not bound by morality because of any 
judgment reached by human reason. Rather, God chooses to issue ethical commands as a 
consequence of His love and His desire to bring about “praiseworthy consequences.” Ibn 
Taymiyya therefore sees divine beneficence as the factor that give God’s will its rational ground, 
leading it in a particular direction (p. 141). In short, God issues the commands He does because 
He loves them and He loves them because they serve the welfare of His creation (p. 168).  
 
Much of Vasalou’s argument for distinguishing Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of reason from that of the 
Muʿtazilites is based on her deconstruction of Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of innate disposition or 
nature (fiṭra). In Ibn Taymiyya’s presentation, Vasalou argues, fiṭra is both a basis for ethical 
knowledge and also a principle of desire that has benefit as its primary object (p. 69). This leads 
us to a conclusion that is not entirely new in Taymiyyan studies: Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding 
of natural reason accords a more ambivalent role to reason than the one it enjoyed in Muʿtazilite 
theories of ethics. Vasalou is also not alone in pointing to a certain circularity in Ibn Taymiyya’s 
ideas here, namely that Ibn Taymiyya’s “claim that we know right and wrong by reason is partly 
given as a claim that we desire right and hate wrong” (p. 68).  
 
What, Vasalou wonders, are we to make of Ibn Taymiyya’s “equivocation” between nature 
reason and desire, his “elision” between the descriptive and normative (p. 114). How can we 
account for the identification of the good with the beneficial and the beneficial with the 
desirable? (p. 82). Vasalou seems dissatisfied with the answer she herself alludes to when she 
points out that what first appears to be an appeal to “pure reason” in Ibn Taymiyya turns out to 
be “an appeal to the human mind as already informed by divine speech” (p. 243). But why should 
this be unsatisfactory? As Rowan Williams argues in The Edge of Words,1 the human attempt to 
account for the world is not a self-generated thing. There can be no ‘pure’ reason independent 
of nature because our attempt to reason about the world occurs in response to, but also from 
within, the ‘nature’ in which we find ourselves. The “slippage” (p. 120) between the language of 
reason and the language of desire to which Vasalou draws attention is thus not particular to Ibn 
Taymiyyah or any particular group of theologians. Rather, it is an inescapable feature of any 
account of reality that takes our embeddedness in nature and our responses to certain kinds of 
acts as a given fact. Ibn Taymiyya advances precisely such an account of reality, one in which 
our knowledge of ethical propositions is grounded in human nature and human desire, with the 
acknowledgment that people can also find wrongdoing to be a pleasure object of desire (p. 88). 
But do such “natural desires whose satisfaction may not be in our interests” (p. 120) fall within 
Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of fiṭra? Vasalou seems to think that they might, although she accepts 
that it is also possible to read Ibn Taymiyya as reserving the term fiṭra for “a higher-order desire 
directed to the true good” (p. 89).  
 
                                                        
1 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language. (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
 
How then, does Ibn Taymiyya distinguish between proper desires and sound reason and 
improper desires and unsound reason? The answer is, of course, through divine revelation. But 
it is not – or ought not to be – a revelation to us that an arch-traditionalist such as Ibn Taymiyya 
continues to harbor “textualist commitments” (p.9) even when celebrating the role of reason. 
Yet Vasalou explicates this seemingly obvious fact at great length, perhaps in order to draw 
attention to scholars who, in her view, have been too quick to ignore the scripturalist 
foundations of Ibn Taymiyya’s account of reason. For instance, she signals her disagreement 
with Opwis’ analysis of Ibn Taymiyya’s account of maṣlaḥa (p. 211). Ibn Taymiyya’s writings on 
maṣlaḥa might suggest that it can potentially encompass “all that is beneficial to human society” 
(p. 204) or that he is speaking of welfare “independently of textual guidance” (p. 205) but in 
actual fact, Vasalou argues, Ibn Taymiyya’s claim of ethical rationalism tilts towards “the 
regulating framework of scripture” (p. 209) to distinguish sound reason from its unsound 
variants. Since reason, in Ibn Taymiyya’s view, is capable of all manner of “fractiousness and 
disorder” (p. 231) it is revelation that ultimately identifies true rationality (p. 236) and true 
maṣlaḥa.   
 
While Vasalou makes a strong case for paying attention to the privileged position of revelation 
in Ibn Taymiyya’s conception of maṣlaḥa, she does not offer a similarly robust defense of her 
claim that Ibn Taymiyya’s views on maṣlaḥa  appear to be aligned to “the more textualist view of 
welfare commonly identified with al-Ghazālī” (p. 210). This is partly because she does not 
consider the range of senses in which Ibn Taymiyya uses the term masṣlaḥa, nor the ways in 
which he deploys the concept in his legal works (particularly his legal responses to queries on 
ritual law) in ways that show the guld separating him from the Ashʿarites. Vasalou must 
acknowledge that in Ibn Taymiyya’s view it is by honoring the demands of God’s divinity that 
“human beings realize their highest good” (p. 177), but her attempt to incorporate this within 
the kind of consequentialist account she associates with Ibn Taymiyya – arguing that for Ibn 
Taymiyya even obedience and worship of God are consequentialist because they constitute the 
welfare of human beings – is implausible. 
 
A more plausible reading of Ibn Taymiyya would recognize that when he talks about obedience 
and worship constituting a human being’s higher good, he is not addressing the question of what 
benefits a human but of what it means to be fully human in the first place. This becomes clear 
when we consider Ibn Taymiyya’s discussion on human perfection in his Ṣafadiyya (which does 
not appear in the bibliography). In that work, which attacks the views of philosophers such as 
al-Fārābī, who had linked human perfection to happiness, virtue and the knowledge of 
philosophy2, Ibn Taymiyya talks about worship and loving obedience to God constituting human 
perfection (kamāl), happiness (saʿāda) and rectitude (ṣalāḥ) together. Ibn Taymiyya does not 
regard worship as a consequentialist means to an end. For him, to be a perfect human is to be 
happy and this perfection and happiness are realized only through the loving obedience of God.3  
 
Another omission in the presentation of Ibn Taymiyya’s account of maṣlaḥa strikes the reader 
when she encounters Vasalou’s claim that in Ibn Taymiyya’s account of divine welfare, human 
beings can never comprehend why an omnipotent God would create a world in which good is 
often intertwined with evil (p. 174) and in which God punishes evil with torment in the afterlife 
(pp. 184, 190). But as Jon Hoover has demonstrated (in a work on Ibn al-Qayyim that does not 
appear in the bibliography), Ibn Taymiyya has a great deal to say on the purposes and benefits 
                                                        
2 Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Siyāsah al-Madaniyya, ed. Fawzī Najjār. (Bayrūt: al-Maţba‘a al-Kāthūlīkiyya, 1964). 
3 Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Ṣafadiyya, ed. Muḥammad R. Sālim. (Riyad: n.p, 1406), 2:242. 
of divine punishment. In fact, Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas on divine punishment (which served as the 
inspiration for Ibn al-Qayyim’s views on the subject) are based on the same theodicy that 
informs his theological writings and both he and Ibn al-Qayyim advance a view on the wisdom 
of punishment and the possibility of universal redemption from punishment that is arrestingly 
optimistic.4  
 
There are, as there are bound to be, some inconsequential errors in the book. Sadat does not 
belong in a register of “extremist Islamist ideologues” (p. 11). It is also not accurate to say of the 
Ashʿarites that they held that “there was a time when God had not yet spoken, and then there 
was a time when he had.” (p. 212). Nevertheless, this book represents a major advance in the 
study of Taymiyyan studies in particular and Islamic intellectual history in general, and it is one 
of Vasalou’s great strengths that she can bring Islamic intellectual thought into dialogue with 
major figures and schools in Western philosophy in a way that few others could.  
                                                        
4 Jon Hoover “Islamic Universalism: Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya's Salafī Deliberations on the Duration of Hell-Fire” 99 
(1) The Muslim World 99.1 (2009): 181-201. 
